Investigate Syscalls to Block with seccomp-bpf #106
Labels
area: nsjail
Related to NsJail and its configuration
priority: 3 - low
status: planning
Discussing details
type: feature
New feature or request
A long time ago I made a rough draft of a filter:
However, because nsjail applies the filter to the forked process before it changes from nsjail to Python, blocking some syscalls may interfere with the functionality of nsjail. The most important one is
execve
, which is what changes the fork from nsjail to Python, so it would have to be excluded from the above filter.The rest of the syscalls above are merely redundancies given the current nsjail configuration. The shared memory syscalls are just there as insurance since the exploit was already fixed long ago by not mounting the stuff needed for it to work.
fork
andclone
are redundant since the PID limit is 1 anyway.Any other ideas for syscalls to filter are welcome.
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