Varsig Specification v0.1.0

Editors

Irakli Gozalishvili, DAG House
Brooklyn Zelenka, Fission

Authors

Irakli Gozalishvili, DAG House
Joel Thorstensson, 3Box Labs
Quinn Wilton, Fission
Brooklyn Zelenka, Fission

Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

Dependencies

IPLD
Multibase
Multicodec

0 Abstract

Varsig is a multiformat for describing signatures over IPLD data and raw bytes in a way that preserves information about the payload and canonicalization information.

1 Introduction

IPLD is a deterministic encoding scheme for data expressed in common types plus content addressed links.

Common formats such as JWT use encoding (e.g. base64) and text separators (e.g. ".") to pass around encoded data and their signatures:

// JWT
"eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCIsInVjdiI6IjAuOC4xIn0.eyJhdWQiOiJkaWQ6a2V5Ono2TWtyNWFlZmluMUR6akc3TUJKM25zRkNzbnZIS0V2VGIyQzRZQUp3Ynh0MWpGUyIsImF0dCI6W3sid2l0aCI6eyJzY2hlbWUiOiJ3bmZzIiwiaGllclBhcnQiOiIvL2RlbW91c2VyLmZpc3Npb24ubmFtZS9wdWJsaWMvcGhvdG9zLyJ9LCJjYW4iOnsibmFtZXNwYWNlIjoid25mcyIsInNlZ21lbnRzIjpbIk9WRVJXUklURSJdfX1dLCJleHAiOjkyNTY5Mzk1MDUsImlzcyI6ImRpZDprZXk6ejZNa2tXb3E2UzN0cVJXcWtSbnlNZFhmcnM1NDlFZnU2cUN1NHVqRGZNY2pGUEpSIiwicHJmIjpbXX0.SjKaHG_2Ce0pjuNF5OD-b6joN1SIJMpjKjjl4JE61_upOrtvKoDQSxZ7WeYVAIATDl8EmcOKj9OqOSw0Vg8VCA"

Many binary-as-text encodings are inefficient and inconvenient. Others have opted to use canonicalization and a tag. This can be effective, but requires careful handling and signalling of the specific canonicalization method used.

const payload = canonicalize({"hello": "world", "count": 42})
{payload: payload, sig: key.sign(sha256(payload))}

Directly signing over canonicalized data introduces new problems: forced encoding and canonicalization attacks.

1.1 Forced Encoding

Data must first be rendered to binary before it is signed. This means imposing an encoding. There is no standard way to include the encoding that some IPLD was encoded with other than a CID. In IPFS, CIDs imply a link, which can have implications for network access and storage. Further, generating a CID means producing a hash, which is then potentially rehashed by the cryptographic signature library.

To remedy this, varsig includes the encoding information used in production of the signature.

1.2 Canonicalization Attacks

Since IPLD is deterministically encoded, it can be tempting to rely on canonicalization at validation time, rather than rendering the IPLD to inline bytes or a CID and signing that. Since the original payload can be rederived from the output, this seems like a clean option:

// DAG-JSON
{
  "role": "user",
  "links": [
    {"/": "bafkreidb2q3ktgtlm5yio7buj3sypyghjtfh5ernsteqmakf4p2c5bwmyi"},
    {"/": "bafkreic75ydg5vkw324oqkcmqltfvc3kivyngqkibjoysdwiilakh4z5fe"},
    {"/": "bafkreiffdiz6raf46zrr3b2usufgz5fo44aggmocz4zappr6khhhljcdpy"}
  ],
  "sig": "8ufaS9w3CGN8cbQTUSoL1i7eaKiWLSXsD2LbZVmvM9zF"
}

This opens the potential for canonicalization attacks. Parsers for certain formats — such as JSON — are known to handle duplicate entries differently. IPLD needs to be serialized to a canonical form before checking the signature. Without careful handling, it is possible to fail to check if any additional fields have been added to the payload which will be parsed by the application.

An object whose names are all unique is interoperable in the sense that all software implementations receiving that object will agree on the name-value mappings. When the names within an object are not unique, the behavior of software that receives such an object is unpredictable. Many implementations report the last name/value pair only. Other implementations report an error or fail to parse the object, and some implementations report all of the name/value pairs, including duplicates.

— RFC8259

{
  "role": "user",  // Parsed by an IPLD implementation
  "role": "admin", // Malicious duplicate field, omitted by the IPLD parser, accepted by the browser
  "links": [
    {"/": "bafkreidb2q3ktgtlm5yio7buj3sypyghjtfh5ernsteqmakf4p2c5bwmyi"},
    {"/": "bafkreic75ydg5vkw324oqkcmqltfvc3kivyngqkibjoysdwiilakh4z5fe"},
    {"/": "bafkreiffdiz6raf46zrr3b2usufgz5fo44aggmocz4zappr6khhhljcdpy"}
  ],
  "sig": "8ufaS9w3CGN8cbQTUSoL1i7eaKiWLSXsD2LbZVmvM9zF"
}

In the above example, the canonicalization step MAY lead to the signature validating, but the client parsing the role: "admin" field instead.

1.2.1 Example

The above can be quite subtle. Here is a step by step example of one such scenario.

An application receives some block of data, as binary. It checks the claimed CID, which validates.

%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

Decoded to a string, the above reads as follows:

"{\n
  "role": "user",\n
  "role": "admin",\n
  "links": [\n
    {"/": "bafkreidb2q3ktgtlm5yio7buj3sypyghjtfh5ernsteqmakf4p2c5bwmyi"},\n
    {"/": "bafkreic75ydg5vkw324oqkcmqltfvc3kivyngqkibjoysdwiilakh4z5fe"},\n
    {"/": "bafkreiffdiz6raf46zrr3b2usufgz5fo44aggmocz4zappr6khhhljcdpy"}\n
  ],\n
  "sig": "8ufaS9w3CGN8cbQTUSoL1i7eaKiWLSXsD2LbZVmvM9zF"\n
}"

Note that the JSON above contains a duplicate role key a sig field with a base64 signature.

Next, the application parses the JSON with the browser's native JSON parser.

{
  "role": "admin", // Picked the second key
  "links": [
    {"/": "bafkreidb2q3ktgtlm5yio7buj3sypyghjtfh5ernsteqmakf4p2c5bwmyi"},
    {"/": "bafkreic75ydg5vkw324oqkcmqltfvc3kivyngqkibjoysdwiilakh4z5fe"},
    {"/": "bafkreiffdiz6raf46zrr3b2usufgz5fo44aggmocz4zappr6khhhljcdpy"}
  ],
  "sig": "8ufaS9w3CGN8cbQTUSoL1i7eaKiWLSXsD2LbZVmvM9zF"
}

The application MUST check the signature of all field minus the sig field. Under the assumption that the binary input was safe, and that canonicalization allows for the deterministic manipulation of the payload, the object is parsed to an internal IPLD representation using Rust/Wasm.

Ipld::Assoc([
    ("role", Ipld::String("user")),
    (
        "links",
        Ipld::Array([
            Ipld::Cid("bafkreidb2q3ktgtlm5yio7buj3sypyghjtfh5ernsteqmakf4p2c5bwmyi"),
            Ipld::Cid("bafkreic75ydg5vkw324oqkcmqltfvc3kivyngqkibjoysdwiilakh4z5fe"),
            Ipld::Cid("bafkreiffdiz6raf46zrr3b2usufgz5fo44aggmocz4zappr6khhhljcdpy"),
        ]),
    ),
    (
        "sig",
        Ipld::Binary([
            %xf2, %xe7, %xda, %x4b, %xdc, %x37, %x08, %x63, %x7c, %x71, %xb4, %x13, %x51, %x2a,
            %x0b, %xd6, %x2e, %xde, %x68, %xa8, %x96, %x2d, %x25, %xec, %x0f, %x62, %xdb, %x65,
            %x59, %xaf, %x33, %xdc, %xc5,
        ]),
    ),
]);

Note that the IPLD parser has dropped the role: "admin" key.

The "sig" field is then removed, and the remaining fields serialized to binary;

Ipld::DagJson::serialize(
    Ipld::Assoc([
        ("role", Ipld::String("user")),
        (
            "links",
            Ipld::Array([
                Ipld::Cid("bafkreidb2q3ktgtlm5yio7buj3sypyghjtfh5ernsteqmakf4p2c5bwmyi"),
                Ipld::Cid("bafkreic75ydg5vkw324oqkcmqltfvc3kivyngqkibjoysdwiilakh4z5fe"),
                Ipld::Cid("bafkreiffdiz6raf46zrr3b2usufgz5fo44aggmocz4zappr6khhhljcdpy"),
            ]),
        )
    ])
);

The signature is then checked against the above fields, which passes since there's only a role: "user" entry. The application then uses the original JSON with the role: "admin" entry.

2 Safety

Data that has already been parsed to an in-memory IPLD representation can be canonically encoded trivially: it has already been through a parser / validator.

Data purporting to conform to an IPLD encoding (such as DAG-JSON) MUST be validated prior to signature verification. This MAY be as simple as round-trip decoding/encoding the JSON and checking that the hash matches. A validation error MUST be signalled if it does not match.

[Implementers] may provide an opt-in for systems where round-trip determinism is a desireable [sic] feature and backward compatibility with old, non-strict data is unnecessary.

— DAG-JSON Spec

As it is critical for guarding against various attacks, the assumptions around canonical encoding MUST be enforced.

2.1 Signing CIDs

Rather than validating the inline IPLD, replacing the data with a CID link to the content MAY be used instead. Note while this is very safe (as it is impractical to alter a signed hash), this approach mixes data layout with security, and may have a performance, disk, and networking impacts.

2.1.1 Caching & Invalidation

Signing CIDs has two additional caching consequences:

Signing CIDs enables a simple strategy for caching validation by CID.
Such a strategy also MAY require accounting for revocation of the signing keys themselves. In this case, the cache would need to include additional information about the signing key.

2.2 Raw (Noncanonicalized) Data

Canonicalization is not required if data is encoded as raw bytes (multicodec %x55). The exact bytes are already present, and MUST not be changed.

3 Varsig Format

After being decoded from unsigned varints, a varsig includes the following segments:

varsig = multibase-prefix %x34 varsig-header varsig-body
multibase-prefix = ALPHA ; Multibase
varsig-header = unsigned-varint ; Usually the public key code from Multicodec
varsig-body = *OCTET; Zero or more segments required by the kind of varsig (e.g. raw bytes, hash algorithm, etc)

For example, here is an EdDSA signature for some content encoded as DAG-PB:

%x34ed01ae3784f03f9ee1163382fa6efa73b0c31ecf58c899c836709303ba4621d1e6df20e09aaa568914290b7ea124f5b38e70b9b69c7de0d216880eac885edd41c302

3.1 Varsig Prefix

The varsig prefix MUST be %x34.

3.2 Signature Header

The prefix of the signature algorithm. This is often the multicodec of the associated public key, but MAY be unique for the signature type. The code MAY live outside the multicodec table. This field MUST act as a discriminant for how many expected fields come in the varsig body, and what each of them mean.

3.3 Varsig Body

The varsig body MUST consist of one or more segments, and MUST be defined by the signature algorithm.

Some examples include:

Raw signature bytes only
CID of DKIM certification transparency record, and raw signature bytes
Hash algorithm multicodec prefix, data encoding prefix, signature counter, nonce, HMAC, and raw signature bytes

4 Payload Encoding

The IPLD data model is encoding agnostic by design. This is very convenient in many applications, such as making for very convenient conversions between types for transmission versus encoding. Unfortunately signatures require signing over specific bytes, and thus over a specific encoding of the data.

To facilitate this, the type encoding-info MAY be used:

encoding-info
  = %x5F   ; Single verbatim payload (without key)
  / %x70   ; DAG-PB multicodec prefix
  / %x71   ; DAG-CBOR multicodec prefix
  / %x0129 ; DAG-JSON multicodec prefix
  / %x6A77 ; JWT
  / %xE191 encoding-info ; EIP-191
  
message-byte-length = unsigned-varint

To manage this, it is RECOMMENDED that varsig types include a nested encoding multiformat. For example, here's a 2048-bit RS256 signature over some DAG-CBOR:

;    RSA       256-bytes       sig-bytes
;     |           |               |
;     v           v               v
%x34 %x1205 %x12 %x0100 %x71 256(OCTET)
; ^          ^           ^
; |          |           |
;varsig   SHA-256     DAG-CBOR

And another showing data signed with EIP-191:

; secp256k1  EIP-191
;     |         |
;     v         v
%x34 %xE7 %x1B %xE191 64(OCTET)
; ^        ^            ^
; |        |            |
;varsig keccak-256   sig-bytes

Note that in the above examples, more nested information MAY be nested inside the encoding info section, depending on the definition of the encoding info.

5 Registry of Common Signature Algorithms

Below are a few common signature headers and their fields.

5.1 RSA

RSASSA-PKCS #1 v1.5 signatures MUST include the following segments:

rsa-varsig = rsa-varsig-header rsa-hash-algorithm signature-byte-length encoding-info sig-bytes

rsa-varsig-header = %x1205 ; RSASSA-PKCS #1 v1.5
rsa-hash-algorithm = unsigned-varint
signature-byte-length = unsigned-varint
encoding-info = 1*unsigned-varint ; Number of segments defined by the encoding header
sig-bytes = *OCTET

5.1.1 Example: RS256

Segment	Hexadecimal	Unsigned Varint	Comment
`rsa-varsig-header`	`%x1205`	`%x8524`	RSASSA-PKCS #1 v1.5 multicodec prefix
`rsa-hash-algorithm`	`%x12`	`%x12`	SHA2-256 multicodec prefix

5.1.3 Example: RS512

Segment	Hexadecimal	Unsigned Varint	Comment
`rsa-varsig-header`	`%x1205`	`%x8524`	RSASSA-PKCS #1 v1.5 multicodec prefix
`rsa-hash-algorithm`	`%x13`	`%x13`	SHA2-512 multicodec prefix

5.2 Ed25519

ed25519-varsig = ed25519-varsig-header encoding-info sig-bytes

ed25519-varsig-header = %xED ; Ed25519 multicodec prefix
encoding-info = 1*unsigned-varint
sig-bytes = 64(OCTET)

Segment	Hexadecimal	Unsigned Varint	Comment
`ed25519-varsig-header`	`%xED`	`%xED01`	Ed25519 key multicodec prefix

5.3 ECDSA

ECDSA defines a general mechanism over many elliptic curves.

ecdsa-varsig = ecdsa-varsig-header ecdsa-hash-algorithm encoding-info sig-bytes

ecdsa-varsig-header = unsigned-varint
ecdsa-hash-algorithm = unsigned-varint
encoding-info = 1*unsigned-varint
sig-bytes = *OCTET

Here are a few examples encoded as varsig:

5.3.1 Example: ES256

es256-varsig = es256-varsig-header es256-hash-algorithm encoding-info sig-bytes

es256-varsig-header = %x1200 ; P-256 multicodec prefix
es256-hash-algorithm = %x12 ; SHA2-256
encoding-info = 1*unsigned-varint
sig-bytes = 64(OCTET)

Segment	Hexadecimal	Unsigned Varint	Comment
`es256-varsig-header`	`%x1200`	`%x8024`	P-256 multicodec prefix
`es256-hash-algorithm`	`%x12`	`%x12`	SHA2-256 multicodec prefix

5.3.2 Example: ES256K

es256k-varsig = es256k-varsig-header es256k-hash-algorithm encoding-info sig-bytes

es256k-varsig-header = %xe7 ; secp256k1 multicodec prefix
es256k-hash-algorithm = %x12 ; SHA2-256
encoding-info = 1*unsigned-varint
sig-bytes = 64(OCTET)

Segment	Hexadecimal	Unsigned Varint	Comment
`es256k-varsig-header`	`%xE7`	`%xE701`	secp256k1 multicodec prefix
`es256k-hash-algorithm`	`%x12`	`%x12`	SHA2-256 multicodec prefix

5.3.3 Example: ES512

es512-varsig = es512-varsig-header es512-hash-algorithm encoding-info sig-bytes

es512-varsig-header = %x1202 ; P-521 multicodec prefix
es512-hash-algorithm = %x13 ; SHA2-512
encoding-info = 1*unsigned-varint
sig-bytes = 128(OCTET)

Segment	Hexadecimal	Unsigned Varint	Comment
`es512-varsig-header`	`%x1202`	`%x8224`	P-521 multicodec prefix
`es512-hash-algorithm`	`%x13`	`%x13`	SHA2-512 multicodec prefix

6 Further Reading

Canonicalization Attacks Against MACs and Signatures
How (not) to sign a JSON object
A Taxonomy of Attacks against XML Digital Signatures & Encryption
PKI Layer Cake

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README.md

README.md

Varsig Specification v0.1.0

Editors

Authors

Language

Dependencies

0 Abstract

1 Introduction

1.1 Forced Encoding

1.2 Canonicalization Attacks

1.2.1 Example

2 Safety

2.1 Signing CIDs

2.1.1 Caching & Invalidation

2.2 Raw (Noncanonicalized) Data

3 Varsig Format

3.1 Varsig Prefix

3.2 Signature Header

3.3 Varsig Body

4 Payload Encoding

5 Registry of Common Signature Algorithms

5.1 RSA

5.1.1 Example: RS256

5.1.3 Example: RS512

5.2 Ed25519

5.3 ECDSA

5.3.1 Example: ES256

5.3.2 Example: ES256K

5.3.3 Example: ES512

6 Further Reading

Files

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README.md

File metadata and controls

Varsig Specification v0.1.0

Editors

Authors

Language

Dependencies

0 Abstract

1 Introduction

1.1 Forced Encoding

1.2 Canonicalization Attacks

1.2.1 Example

2 Safety

2.1 Signing CIDs

2.1.1 Caching & Invalidation

2.2 Raw (Noncanonicalized) Data

3 Varsig Format

3.1 Varsig Prefix

3.2 Signature Header

3.3 Varsig Body

4 Payload Encoding

5 Registry of Common Signature Algorithms

5.1 RSA

5.1.1 Example: RS256

5.1.3 Example: RS512

5.2 Ed25519

5.3 ECDSA

5.3.1 Example: ES256

5.3.2 Example: ES256K

5.3.3 Example: ES512

6 Further Reading